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PrivacyAbstract The authentication schemes for telecare medical information systems (TMIS) try to
ensure secure and authorized access. ID-based authentication schemes address secure communica-
tion, but privacy is not properly addressed. In recent times, dynamic ID-based remote user authen-
tication schemes for TMIS have been presented to protect user’s privacy. The dynamic ID-based
authentication schemes efﬁciently protect the user’s privacy. Unfortunately, most of the existing
dynamic ID-based authentication schemes for TMIS ignore the input verifying condition. This
makes login and password change phases inefﬁcient. Inefﬁciency of the password change phase
may lead to denial of service attack in the case of incorrect input in the password change phase.
To overcome these weaknesses, we proposed a new dynamic ID-based authentication scheme using
a smart card. The proposed scheme can quickly detect incorrect inputs which makes the login and
password change phase efﬁcient. We adopt the approach with the aim to protect privacy, and efﬁ-
cient login and password change phases. The proposed scheme also resists off-line password guess-
ing attack and denial of service attack. We also demonstrate the validity of the proposed scheme by
utilizing the widely-accepted BAN (Burrows, Abadi, and Needham) logic. In addition, our scheme
is comparable in terms of the communication and computational overheads with relevant schemes
for TMIS.
 2015 The Authors. Production and hosting by Elsevier B.V. on behalf of King Saud University. This is
an open access article under theCCBY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).1. Introduction
The omnipresence and easy access of the Internet, provides a
scalable platform for healthcare services. One of the popularhealth care services is telecare medical information systems
(TMIS) which supports healthcare delivery services to the
patients’ homes. As we are moving from paper based health
records to electronic health records, the TMIS offers an easy
access of electronic records to remote users. TMIS is making
a difference by employing information and communication
technologies to enhance the quality of healthcare related ser-
vices in the management of chronic diseases.
Increasing computation power has made the adversary
powerful enough so that he can control communications over
the public network (Aloul et al., 2009a; Mishra et al., 2014a;
Alfantookh, 2006). Thus, authorized communication is
required to ensure in TMIS. To reduce the adversary threat,
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developed (Aloul et al., 2009b; Mishra et al., 2014b; Al-
Muhtadi, 2007), which goal is to address the following
attributes:
One time registration: It allows the patient to register once
with the medical server and then he can access the services
any number of times.
Efficient login phase: A login phase should be capable of
detecting incorrect login inputs. In other words, smart card
should not execute the login session in the case of wrong
identity or password input.
Efficient password change phase: The scheme should be able
to quickly detect incorrect inputs in the password change
phase.
User-friendly password change phase: A user should be
allowed to change his password input and only allows a
patient to update his password freely without the medical
server’s assistance.
Mutual authentication and session key agreement: It allows a
patient and medical servers to mutually authenticate each
other and establish a common key, which should be con-
structed with the equal participation of both the user and
server.
Security attributes: The smart card based authentication
scheme must be able to withstand man-in-the middle attack,
impersonation attack, guessing attack, insider attack, replay
attack, stolen smart card attack and known session-speciﬁc
temporary information attack. Moreover, the scheme
should support session key agreement, key freshness prop-
erty, mutual authentication and forward secrecy.
Wu et al. (2012) introduced an efﬁcient authentication
scheme for TMIS, which is better than the previously proposed
schemes for low computing devices by adding the pre-
computing phase. In the pre-computing phase, the user per-
forms an exponential operation, and then stores the calculated
values into the storage device such that a user can extract these
values from the device whenever he requires. However, He
et al. (2012) demonstrated that Wu et al.’s scheme fails to resist
an impersonation attack. They also introduced an enhanced
scheme and claimed that their proposed scheme eliminates
the drawbacks of Wu et al.’s scheme. They also claimed that
their scheme is more appropriate for low power mobile devices
for TMIS. Although Wei et al. (2012) identiﬁed that both Wu
et al.’s and He et al.’s schemes are inefﬁcient to meet two-
factor authentication, whereas an efﬁcient password based
authentication scheme using a smart card should achieve
two-factor authentication. They also presented an improved
smart card based authentication scheme for TMIS to ensure
two-factor authentication. In 2012, Zhu (2012) demonstrated
that Wei et al.’s scheme is vulnerable to off-line password
guessing attack. He also presented an improved scheme for
TMIS and claimed that his scheme could overcome the weak-
nesses of Wei et al.’s scheme. However, his scheme does not
protect anonymity which enables an adversary to track the
consumer’s current location and login history (Mishra and
Mukhopadhyay, 2014). Although consumer’s anonymity dur-
ing message exchange ensures consumer’s privacy by prevent-
ing an attacker from acquiring a consumer’s sensitive personal
information.Chen et al. (2012) proposed a dynamic ID-based authenti-
cation scheme for TMIS which protects user anonymity and
has less computation overhead. However, in 2013, Lin (2013)
demonstrated that user identity is compromised under the dic-
tionary attack and the password can be derived with the stolen
smart card in Chen et al’s scheme. He also proposed an
improved scheme which efﬁciently resists dictionary attack
and protects anonymity. Unfortunately, Lin’s scheme does
not include the input verifying condition. This makes login
and password change phases inefﬁcient. The inefﬁciency of
the login phase causes extra communication and computation
overhead. The inefﬁcient password change phase in Lin’s
scheme causes denial of service attack (DOS) in the case of
incorrect input in password change (Mishra, 2015b). The
DOS attack does not allow an authorized user to access the
resources (Alfantookh, 2006). Xie et al. (2013) showed that
Chen et al.’s scheme is vulnerable to an impersonation attack
and off-line password guessing attack using a stolen smart
card. Additionally, they presented an improved scheme for
TIMS to overcome the weaknesses of Chen et al.’s scheme.
However, Xie et al.’s scheme also failed to present an efﬁcient
login and password change phase (Mishra, 2015b). Cao and
Zhai (2013) demonstrated that Chen et al’s scheme is vulnera-
ble to an off-line identity guessing attack and undetectable on-
line password guessing attack using a stolen smart card. They
also proposed an improved authentication scheme to resist
guessing attacks. Their scheme efﬁciently protects anonymity
and password guessing attack, but does not present an efﬁcient
login phase and has an unfriendly password change phase
(Mishra, 2015b). The smart card cannot identify the correct-
ness of the input in the above discussed schemes (Lin, 2013;
Wei et al., 2012; Xie et al., 2013; Zhu, 2012; Xu et al., 2014;
Lee et al., 2013; Jiang et al., 2014) which either causes DOS
attack or makes the password chance phase unfriendly. The
schemes (Lin, 2013; Wei et al., 2012; Xie et al., 2013; Zhu,
2012; Xu et al., 2014; Lee et al., 2013; Jiang et al., 2014) present
an inefﬁcient password change phase (Mishra, 2015b; Mishra,
2015a) and the schemes (Cao and Zhai, 2013; Jiang et al., 2013;
Wu and Xu, 2013) have an unfriendly password change phase
as every time before changing the password the user has to
establish an authorized session with the server, that is, user
cannot independently change his/her password in these
schemes. More detailed characterization of security attributes
of the schemes (Wei et al., 2012; Zhu, 2012; Lee et al., 2013;
Chen et al., 2012; Cao and Zhai, 2013; Xie et al., 2013; Lin,
2013; Xu et al., 2014) is presented in Table 1.
Motivation: Many of the schemes (Lin, 2013; Wei et al.,
2012; Xie et al., 2013; Zhu, 2012; Xu et al., 2014; Lee et al.,
2013) cannot identify the correctness of input which leads to
a denial of service scenario in the case of incorrect input in
the password change phase (Mishra, 2015a,b). A single mis-
take in the password change phase does not allow a user to
login to the server using the same smart card. In other words,
an authorized user can never use the smart card to login to the
server if he/she commits a mistake in password change. It is a
serious security pitfall as user’s may himself/herself cause
denial of service attack. In general, a user cannot be considered
an expert who never commits a mistake. It is always be possi-
ble that a human may sometimes forget the password or com-
mit a mistake while entering the password. Moreover, a user
may have several accounts and may use different passwords
Table 1 Security attributes comparison of some recent password based authentication schemes for TMIS.
Security attributes Schemes
Wei et al.
(2012)
Zhu
(2012)
Lee et al.
(2013)
Chen et al.
(2012)
Cao and Zhai
(2013)
Xie et al.
(2013)
Lin
(2013)
Xu et al.
(2014)
User anonymity   p p p p p p
Insider attack
p p p p p p p p
Oﬀ-line password guessing
attack
 p p  p p p p
Replay attack
p p p p  p p p
Session key agreement
p  p p p p p p
Session key veriﬁcation
p  p  p   p
Eﬃcient password change
phase
   p p   
Denial of service attack    p p   
User-friendly password
change phase
   p  p p p
Eﬃcient login    p    
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account password in another account by mistake. Thus, the
mistake in the password change phase should not affect the
outcome the denial of service attack. In order to overcome this
drawback, efﬁcient authentication schemes should be able to
quickly detect incorrect inputs so that the denial of service sce-
nario can be avoided for authorized users.
Our contributions: In this article, we propose an improved
scheme with the aim to achieve an efﬁcient login phase and
password change phase. The proposed scheme protects the
user’s privacy and resists guessing attack. Moreover, we
demonstrate the validity of the proposed scheme through the
BAN (Burrows, Abadi, and Needham) logic.
Organization of the article: The rest of the article is sketched
as follows: The proposed password based authentication
scheme for TMIS is presented in Section 2. Section 3 presents
the security analysis. Section 4 discuss the comparative perfor-
mance of the proposed scheme. Finally, the conclusion is
drawn in Section 5.Table 2 Meaning of symbols used throughout the paper.
Notation Descryption
S A trustworthy server
p; q Two large primes
N Product of p and q
ZN Ring of integers modulo N
e Public key of S
d Private/secret key of S
E Adversary/attacker
SC Smart card
U User/patient
IDU Identity of U
PWU Password of U
hðÞ A collision resistant one-way hash function
 XOR
jj String concatenation operation
DT Valid time delay in message transmission2. Proposed password based authentication scheme
In this section, we propose an improved scheme to ensure efﬁ-
cient authorized communication. The proposed scheme is
designed with the aim to provide an anonymous and efﬁcient
authentication phase. In this scheme, a new user ﬁrst completes
his registration with the server, and achieved a personalized
smart card. Then, the registered user can establish an autho-
rized session with the server. The scheme comprises of four
phases, namely, registration, login, authentication and pass-
word change. The notations used in the proposed scheme are
given in Table 2.
2.1. Registration phase
The server S generates two large primes p and q of 512-bits and
computes N ¼ pq of 1024-bits modulus. S also chooses a prime
number e and an integer d such that ed  1 mod ðp 1Þ
ðq 1Þ. S keeps p; q and d secret, and makes N and e public.
Then a new user U can register to the server and achieve a per-
sonalized smart card as follows:Step 1. User U chooses a password of his choice and a ran-
dom number b. U computes W ¼ hðPW U jjbÞ and
submits the registration request with a message
hIDU ;W i to S via secure channel.
Step 2. Upon receiving the U’s request, S veriﬁes whether
IDU is previously registered or not. If IDU is already
registered, S asks for a new identity. Otherwise, S
computes H ¼ hðd  IDU Þ and v ¼ W  H . Then S
personalizes smart card SC by embedding the
parameters fN ; v; e; hðÞg and returns SC to U via
secure channel. S stores IDU in registered users’
database.
Step 3. U computes H ¼ v W ;A ¼ b hðIDU jjPW U Þ and
B ¼ hðbjjH jjhðIDU jjPW U ÞÞ. Then U stores A and B
into the smart card (see Fig. 1).
2.2. Login phase
A register user with a valid smart card generates the login mes-
sage and sends the login message to the server as follows:
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reader and inputs IDU and PW U .
Step 2. SC computes b ¼ A hðIDU jjPW U Þ;W ¼ hðPW U jjbÞ
and H ¼ v W . SC veriﬁes B¼? hðbjjH jj
hðIDU jjPW U ÞÞ. If the veriﬁcation does not hold, SC
terminates the session. Otherwise, SC selects a ran-
dom number ru, and computes R ¼ hðIDU jjrujj
H jjT uÞ and X ¼ ðIDU jjrujjRÞe mod N where T u is
the current timestamp. SC sends the message
hX ; T ui to S (see Fig. 2).
2.3. Authentication phase
User and server mutually authenticate each other and establish
a session key as follows:
Step 1. Upon receiving the message hX ; T ui at time T 0u; S
veriﬁes T 0u  T u 6 Dt. If the veriﬁcation holds, S
computes Xd mod N ¼ ðIDU jjrujjRÞ and
H ¼ hðd  IDU Þ. S veriﬁes R¼? hðIDU jjrujjH jjT uÞ. If
the veriﬁcation holds, S considers U as an autho-
rized user.
Step 2. S computes the session key skSU ¼ hðH
ru  T u  T sÞ and Y ¼ hðIDU jjskSU jjHÞ. Finally, S
responds with the message hY ; T si.
Step 3. Upon receiving the responder’s message hY ; T si at
time T 0s; SC checks whether the condition
ðT 0s  T sÞ 6 Dt holds. If the condition holds, SC
computes session key skUS ¼ hðH  ru  T u  T sÞ.
Then SC veriﬁes Y ¼? hðIDU jjskUS jjHÞ. If the veriﬁca-
tion holds, U considers skUS as the session key and S
as a authorized server (see Fig. 3).
2.4. Password change phase
A legal user U can change the password of the smart card with-
out the server’s assistance. To change the password, he inserts
the smart card into the card reader, and inputs current pass-
word and identity. The smart card veriﬁes the correctness of
the current password and identity. If the veriﬁcation holds,
the smart card asks for a new password and then completes
the password update. The description of password change
phase is as follows:Figure 1 Registration phase: a new user U registers with his identity
fN; v; e; hðÞg. U also stores A and B into the smart card.Step 1. User U inputs PW U and IDU .
Step 1. The smart card SC computes hðIDU jjPW U Þ and
achieves b ¼ A hðIDU jjPW U Þ;W ¼ hðPW U jjbÞ and
H ¼ v W . SC veriﬁes B¼? hðbjjH jjhðIDU jjPW U ÞÞ.
If the veriﬁcation does not hold, SC terminates the
session. Otherwise, SC asks for a new password.
Step P2. User U enters new password PW new.
Step P3. The smart card SC computes W new ¼ hðPW newjjbÞ;
vnew ¼ H  W new;Anew ¼ b hðIDU jjPW newÞ, and
Bnew ¼ hðbjjH jjhðIDU jjPW newÞÞ. SC replaces A with
Anew;B with Bnew, and v with vnew (see Fig. 4).
3. Security analysis
In this section, we show how the proposed scheme satisﬁes
desirable security attributes.
3.1. Authentication proof based on BAN logic
Some notations used in BAN logic analysis are described as
follows:
P j  X : The principal P believes the statement X.
P / X : P sees X, means that P has received a message X.
P j  X : P once said X, means that P j  X when P sent it.
P j ) X : P controls X ; P has an authority on X (Jurisdiction
over X).
]ðX Þ: The message X is fresh.
P j  Q$K P : P and Q use K (shared key) to communicate
with each other.
P$x Q : x is a shared secret information between P and Q.
fXgK : The formula X is encrypted under K.
hX iY : The formula X is combined with formula Y.
ðX ÞK : The formula X is hashed with the key K.
!K P : K is public key of P.
P X Q : X is a secret formula, known only to P and Q.
In order to describe logical postulates of BAN logic in for-
mal terms (Burrows et al., 1989; Syverson and Cervesato,
2001), we present the following rules:
Rule (1). Message meaning rule:
For shared secret keys:
Pj  Q$K P;P / fXgK
Pj  Qj  X ð1ÞIDU and achieve a personalized smart card with stored parameters
Figure 2 Login phase: a user U generates a login message hX;Tui using the smart card, and sends it to server S.
Figure 3 Authentication phase: user and server verify the authenticity of each other and draw a session key.
Figure 4 Password change phase: a user changes the password of the smart card without server assistance.
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under k, then P believes that Q once said X.
Rule (2). The nonce veriﬁcation rule:
Pj  ]ðXÞ;Pj  Qj  X
Pj  Qj  X ð2Þ
If P believes that X has been uttered recently (freshness) and P
believes that Q once said X, and then P believes that Q believes
X.
Rule (3). The jurisdiction rule:
Pj  Qj ) X;Pj  Qj  X
Pj  X ð3Þ
If P believes that Q has jurisdiction over X, and P believes that
Q believes a message X, then P believes X.
Rule (4). The freshness rule:
Pj  ]ðXÞ
Pj  ]ðX;YÞ ð4ÞIf one part is known to be fresh, then the entire formula must
be fresh.
According to the analytic procedures of the BAN logic, the
proposed protocol will satisfy the following goals:
Goal 1. U j  ðU$SK SÞ;
Goal 2. Sj  ðU$SK SÞ;
The protocol generic type:Message 1. U ! S : ðIDU jjrujjhðIDU jjrujjH jjT uÞÞemodN ; T u
Message 2. S ! U : hðIDU jjskjjHÞ; T s
Idealize form of the protocol:Message 1. U ! S : fIDU ; ru; ðIDU ; ru; T uÞHge; T u
Message 2. S ! U : ðIDU ;U$sk SÞH ; T s
We make the following assumptions about the initial state
of the protocol to analyze the proposed protocol:
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A2: Sj  ]ðT sÞ;
A3: U j  ðU$H SÞ;
A4: Sj  ðU$H SÞ;
A5: U j  Sj  ðU$H SÞ;
A6: Sj  U j  ðU$H SÞ;
We analyze the idealized form of the proposed protocol
based on the BAN logic rules and the assumptions. The main
proofs are described as follows:
According to the message 1, we could get:
S1: S / ðIDU; ru;TuÞH;Tu
According to the assumption A4, we apply the message
meaning rule to get:
S2: Sj  Uj  Tu
According to the assumption A1, we apply the freshness
conjuncatenation rule to get:
S3: Sj  ]ðIDU; ruTuÞH
According to the S2 and S3, we apply nonce veriﬁcation
rule to obtain
S4: Sj  Uj  ðIDU; ru;TuÞH
According to the assumption A4 and S4, we apply the
jurisdiction rule to get:
S5: Sj  Tu
According to sk ¼ hðH ru  Tu  TsÞ;S5 and A2, we
could obtain
S6: Sj  ðU$SK SÞ (Goal 2.)
According to the message 2, we could obtain:
S7: U / ðIDU;U$sk SÞH;Ts
According to the assumption A3, we apply the message
meaning rule to get:
S8: Uj  Sj  Ts
According to the assumption A2, we apply the freshness
conjuncatenation rule to get:
S9: Uj  ]ðIDU;U$sk SÞH
According to the S8 and S9, we apply nonce veriﬁcation
rule to obtain
S10: Uj  Sj  ðIDU;U$sk SÞH
According to the assumption A3 and S10, we apply the
jurisdiction rule to get:
S11: Uj  Ts
According to sk ¼ hðH ru  Tu  TsÞ;S11 and A1, we
could obtain
S12: Uj  ðU$SK SÞ (Goal 1.)
3.2. Discussion on the possible attacks
3.2.1. User anonymity and unlinkability
The login message hX;Tui is encrypted with the server’s public
key and includes user’s identity along with random value r, i.e.,
X ¼ ðIDUjjrujjRÞe mod N. As X is encrypted with the server’s
public key, no adversary can retrieve IDU from X. Moreover,
the smart card does not include the user’s identity. Therefore,
an adversary cannot identify the message source. The times-
tamp Tu is distinct for each session. This ensures distinct login
messages for each session. Thus an adversary cannot link
between any two login messages. Unlinkability and anonymity
make communication completely private.3.2.2. Insider attack
A malicious insider in the server’s system may try to achieve
the user’s password. However, the user does not submit the
password PWU in its original form, i.e., user submits
hðPWUjjbÞ instead of PWU to the server. Therefore, a mali-
cious insider cannot know the user’s password PWU as hash
function hðÞ cannot be reverted. Moreover, an adversary can-
not perform the password guessing attack as the user does not
submit b to S.
3.2.3. Efficient login phase
The smart card SC can identify the correctness of the input in
the following cases as follows:
Case-1 If a user inputs an incorrect password PWU and cor-
rect identity IDU.
The smart card SC computes hðIDU jjPW U Þ and achieves
b ¼ A hðIDU jjPW U Þ;W  ¼ hðPW U jjbÞ and H  ¼ v W .
The smart card SC computes B ¼ hðbjjH jjhðIDU jjPW U ÞÞ
and veriﬁes B¼? B. The veriﬁcation does not hold as
B–B. Therefore, SC terminates the session.
Case-2 If a user inputs incorrect identity IDU and correct
password PWU.
The smart card SC computes hðIDU jjPW U Þ and achieves b0 ¼
A hðIDU jjPW U Þ;W 0 ¼ hðPW U jjb0Þ and H 0 ¼ v W 0.
The smart card SC computes B0 ¼ hðb0jjH 0jjhðIDU jjPW U ÞÞ
and veriﬁes B¼? B0. The veriﬁcation does not hold as
B–B0. Therefore, SC terminates the session.
Case-3 If a user inputs incorrect identity IDU and incorrect
password PWU.
The smart card SC computes hðIDU jjPW U Þ and achieves b00
¼ A hðIDU jjPW U Þ;W 00 ¼ hðPW U jjb00Þ andH 00 ¼ v W 00.
The smart card SC computes B00 ¼ hðb00jjH 00jjhðIDU jj
PW U ÞÞ and veriﬁes B¼? B00. The veriﬁcation does not hold
as B–B00. Therefore, SC terminates the session.
In all the cases, smart card can efﬁciently detect the incor-
rect input and terminate the session. This shows that the pro-
posed scheme has an efﬁcient login phase.
3.2.4. User-friendly and efficient password changes phase
The user can change his password without the server’s assis-
tance. Moreover, the smart card veriﬁes the correctness of
inputs using the condition B¼? hðbjjHjjhðIDUjjPWUÞÞ which
includes identity and password, and is similar to the login
phase. As the login phase can efﬁciently verify the correctness
of the input, the password change phase can also be efﬁcient to
detect the incorrect input.
3.2.5. Stolen smart card attack
An adversary can retrieve the parameters hN; v; e;A;Bi from
the stolen smart card and try to generate a valid login message
using the achieved parameters. However, to construct the valid
login message hX;Tui, is equivalent to achieve a user’s long-
term key H along with identity IDU as R ¼ hðIDUjjrujjHjjTuÞ.
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use the stolen smart card to generate a valid login message.
3.2.6. Off-line password guessing attack
To succeed a password guessing attack, veriﬁcation of the
guessed password is necessary. The password is associated with
the following values: v ¼ hðPWUjjbÞ  hðd IDUÞ;A ¼ b
hðIDUjjPWUÞ and B ¼ hðbjjHjjhðIDUjjPWUÞÞ. To verify the
password using the expression B ¼ hðbjjHjjhðIDUjjPWUÞÞ, an
adversary needs to achieve b and H. Although H cannot be
achieved without knowing b as H ¼ v hðPWUjjbÞ. Since
b ¼ A hðIDUjjPWUÞ, to retrieve b, user identity IDU is
needed. Neither the smart card nor the transmitted message
includes the user’s identity. This shows that the proposed
scheme resists the password guessing attack.
3.2.7. Replay attack
Replay attack is the most common attack in the authentication
process. However, the common countermeasures are
timestamp and random number. In the proposed scheme, the
transmitted login message hX;Tui includes timestamp. More-
over, to modify the message hX0ð¼ ðIDUjjrujjR0Þe mod NÞ;TEi
using current timestamp TE, an adversary has to compute
R0 ¼ hðIDUjjrujjHjjTEÞ. The computation of R0 requires H
along with IDU. Since, H and IDU are secret, an adversary can-
not replay the previously transmitted messages.
3.2.8. User impersonation attack
An adversary E can masquerade as a legitimate user to login to
the server. However, the proposed scheme can resist this attack
as follows:
E can try to login to the server using replay attack.
Although the proposed scheme resists the replay attack.
E can try to generate a valid login message hX 0; T Ei for a
random value rE and current timestamp T E, where
X 0 ¼ ðIDU jjrEjjR0Þe mod N . To compute X 0;E has to com-
pute R0. However, no unauthorized user can compute R0
due to following facts:
– To compute R0, user’s secret keyH and identity IDU are nee-
ded as R0 ¼ hðIDU jjrEjjH jjT EÞ.
– Neither the smart card nor the transmitted messages incl-
udes IDU . Thus, an adversary cannot achieve IDU .
– To retrieve H from v, the password is needed. Since the
password is only known to the user, an adversary cannot
achieve H.This shows that the proposed scheme resists user imperson-
ation attack.
3.2.9. Server impersonation attack
An adversary E can masquerade as a server and try to respond
with a valid message to the user. When the user U sends the
login message hX;Tui to the server, E can intercept the message
and try to respond with the valid message. However, an adver-
sary cannot successfully impersonate a valid user which is jus-
tiﬁed as follows:
E can try to responde with the old transmitted message
hY ; T si to a user. However, the timestamp mechanism
reveals the replay of message. Moreover, to replace T s withcurrent timestamp T E;E has to compute Y 0 ¼ hðIDU jj
sk0SU jjHÞ as skSU ¼ hðH  ru  T u  T SÞ includes timestamp.
To compute skSU ;H and ru are needed.
E can try to responde with the message hY E; T Ei, where
Y E ¼ hðIDU jjskEU jjHÞ and skEU ¼ hðH  rE  T u  T SÞ for
random value rE and current timestamp T E. To compute
skEU ;E needs H.
To retrieve H from v, the password is needed. Since the
password is only known to the user, an adversary cannot
get H.
This shows that the proposed scheme resists server imper-
sonation attack.
3.2.10. Man-in-the middle attack
An adversary E may try to establish independent connections
with license server and consumer. Since the user’s message is
encrypted with server’s public key, an adversary cannot modify
the user’s message. Moreover, server’s response message does
not include any session value. This shows that the proposed
scheme resists man-in-the middle attack.
3.2.11. Known key secrecy
An adversary cannot achieve or guess any secret from any
compromised session key as the session key is the hashed
output of user long-term key along with random value and
timestamp, i.e., sk ¼ hðH ru  Tu  TsÞ. Moreover, the
secret key includes the timestamp which ensures a unique
key for each session. These facts show that compromise of a
particular session key does not result in compromise of the
other session key.
3.2.12. Known session-specific temporary information attack
If the short term secret value ru is compromised, then adver-
sary cannot compute session key sk ¼ hðH ru  TuÞ as to
compute session key, user’s long-term key H is needed along
with the random value ru where H is protected with the
password.
3.2.13. Forward secrecy
If user’s long-term key H is compromised, an adversary cannot
achieve the established session key sk ¼ hðH ru  Tu  TsÞ as
the session key includes a random value ru, which is encrypted
with the server’s public key e, i.e., X ¼ ðIDUjjrujjRÞe mod N.
Therefore, an adversary cannot be achieved ru using H.
3.2.14. Key freshness property
Each session key involves a random number and timestamp
where random numbers and timestamps are different for each
session. The uniqueness of these values guarantees the unique
key for each session. The unique key construction for each ses-
sion ensures the key freshness property.
3.2.15. Mutual authentication
Server veriﬁes user’s authenticity with the condition
R¼? hðIDUjjrujj HjjTuÞ where to compute R;H and IDU are
needed. The user veriﬁes authenticity of the server with the
condition Y¼? hðIDUjjskjjHÞ, to compute Y, again H and IDU
are needed. Since, IDU and H are secret, user and server can
correctly verify the authenticity of each other.
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In this section, we show the efﬁciency analysis of proposed
schemes with similar password based remote user authenti-
cation protocols based on smart card for the TMIS. Let
the user identity ID, password PW, random variables, time
stamp and output size of hash function is 128-bits while
e;X; n all are of 1024-bits. Let Th;TE and TX denote the
time complexity of the hash function, exponential operation
and XOR operation, respectively. It is well known that the
time complexity of the XOR operation is negligible as com-
pared to two other operations. So, we do not take TX into
account. In general, the time complexity associated with
Th;TE and TX can be more or less expressed as
TE 	 Th 	 TX (Potlapally et al., 2006; Wong et al., 2001).
Then, the extra communication and computation overheads
are as follows:
In Lin’s scheme, computation ofW;CID;R;X is required in
the login phase, and Xd mod N;H;R;CID; k;V; k0 and V0 is
required in the veriﬁcation phase. So the computation over-
head in the login phase is 3Th þ TE and the veriﬁcation phase
is 7Th þ TE. The user and server transmit the messages
hX;R;T1i and hV; ki, therefore the communication overhead
is 1536ð¼ 4 128þ 1024Þ bits. The smart card stores the
values N; v; e and t, therefore, the memory required is
2304ð¼ 2 128þ 2 1024Þ.
In Xie et al.’s scheme, user’s smart card computes
hðPWÞ;A;C1 and AID in the login phase. Therefore, computa-
tion cost in the login phase is 2Th þ 2TE. In the veriﬁcation
phase, smart card computes Ksu; sksu and C
0
u while server com-
putes AIDXðmodnÞ;DsymðXÞ ðRIDÞ; J;Cs;B;Kus; skus and C0s.
Therefore, the computation overhead in the veriﬁcation phase
is 6Th þ TS þ 4TE. The user transmits the message hAID;Tui
and hC2;Ts;Bi, therefore the communication overhead is
2432ð¼ 3 128þ 2 1024Þ bits. The smart card stores the
values fID;SC;N;L; n; eg, therefore, the memory required is
2660ð¼ 4 128þ 2 1024Þ bits.Table 3 Performance comparison between the proposed scheme an
Overhead/schemes Chen et al.’s (2012) Lin’s (2013) Ca
l1 384 2304 bits 12
l2 960 1536 bits 14
l3 3Th 3Th þ TE Th
l4 8Th 7Th þ TE 7T
l5 11Th 10Th þ 2TE 8T
l6 2 2 3
S1
p p p
S2  p p
S3  p p
S4  p p
S5
p p p
S6  p p
S7
p p 
S8
p p p
S9
p  p
l1: storage overhead; l2: communication overhead in login and authenticat
overhead in veriﬁcation phase; l5: total computation overhead in login and
attack; S2: user’s impersonation attack; S3: off-line password guessing a
attack; S6: forward secrecy; S7: known session speciﬁc temporary informIn Cao and Zhai’s scheme, user’s smart card computes
hðbjjPWÞ and AID in the login phase. Therefore, computation
cost in the login phase is Th þ TE. In the veriﬁcation phase,
smart card computes Ksu;Cs and Cu while the server computes
AIDXðmodnÞ; J;Ks;Cs and Cu. Therefore, the computation
overhead in the veriﬁcation phase is 7Th þ TE. The user trans-
mits the message hAIDi; hrs;Csi and Cu. Therefore the commu-
nication overhead is 1408ð¼ 3 128þ 1024Þ bits. The smart
card stores the values fL; n; bg, therefore, the memory required
is 1280ð¼ 2 128þ 1024Þ bits.
In the proposed scheme, computation of hðPWUjjIDUÞ;
W;B;R;X in the login phase and Xd mod N;H;
R; skSU;Y; skUS and Y in the veriﬁcation phase. Therefore,
the computation overhead in the login phase is 4Th þ TE and
the veriﬁcation phase is 6Th þ TE. The user and server transmit
the messages hX;Tui and hY;Tsi, therefore the communication
overhead is 1408ð¼ 3 128þ 1024Þ bits. The smart card
stores the parameter N; v; e;A and B. Therefore, the required
memory is 2432ð¼ 3 128þ 2 1024Þ. (see Table 3)
It can be easily seen from Table 1 that most of the authen-
tication schemes for TMIS do not protect privacy. The
dynamic ID based authentication schemes protect privacy,
but do not resist denial of service attack (Lin, 2013; Xie
et al., 2013). Chen et al.’s dynamic ID-based authentication
scheme (Chen et al., 2012) and Cao and Zhai’s dynamic ID-
based authentication scheme (Cao and Zhai, 2013) efﬁciently
resist denial of service attack, but Chen et al.’s scheme does
not resist password and identity guessing attacks, while Cao
and Zhai’s scheme does not withstand known session speciﬁc
temporary information attack. However, the proposed scheme
protects privacy and resists guessing and denial of service
attacks. Moreover, the proposed scheme resists known session
speciﬁc temporary information attack and attains forward
secrecy. The proposed scheme satisﬁes desirable security and
it is comparable in terms of the communication and computa-
tional overheads with the relevant schemes, this makes the pro-
posed scheme more appropriate for TMIS.d other relevant schemes.
o and Zhai’s (2013) Xie et al.’s (2013) Proposed scheme
80 2660 bits 2432 bits
08 2432 bits 1280 bits
þ TE 2Th þ 2TE 4Th þ TE
h þ TE 6Th þ TS þ 4TE 6Th þ TE
h þ 2TE 8Th þ TS þ 6TE 10Th þ 2TE
2 2p p
p p
p p
 pp p
p p
 pp p
 p
ion phases; l3: computation overhead in login phase; l4: computation
authentication phases; l6: number of messages exchanged; S1: replay
ttack; S4: on-line password guessing attack; S5: man-in-the middle
ation attack; S8: insider attack; S9: denial of service attack.
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We have discussed the failure of excising schemes for TMIS to
present efﬁcient login and password change phases in the liter-
ature. We have proposed an efﬁcient and secure dynamic ID-
based authentication scheme for TMIS. The proposed scheme
maintains efﬁcient login and password change phases where
incorrect input can be quickly detected. Additionally, the
scheme can efﬁciently resist guessing attacks and protect the
user’s privacy. Furthermore, the security analysis indicates
that the proposed scheme satisﬁes all desirable security attri-
butes. The performance analysis shows that the proposed
scheme is comparable in terms of the communication and com-
putational overheads with dynamic ID-based authentication
schemes for TMIS.
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